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Abstract
JavaScript (JS) engine vulnerabilities pose significant security
threats affecting billions of web browsers. While fuzzing is
a prevalent technique for finding such vulnerabilities, there
have been few studies that leverage the recent advances in
neural network language models (NNLMs). In this paper, we
present Montage, the first NNLM-guided fuzzer for finding JS
engine vulnerabilities. The key aspect of our technique is to
transform a JS abstract syntax tree (AST) into a sequence of
AST subtrees that can directly train prevailing NNLMs. We
demonstrate that Montage is capable of generating valid JS
tests, and show that it outperforms previous studies in terms
of finding vulnerabilities. Montage found 37 real-world bugs,
including three CVEs, in the latest JS engines, demonstrating
its efficacy in finding JS engine bugs.
1 Introduction
The memory safety of web browsers has emerged as a critical
attack vector as they have become an integral part of every-
day computing. Malicious websites, which conduct drive-
by download attacks [48], have typically exploited memory
corruption vulnerabilities of web browsers. Currently, an ex-
ploitable memory corruption vulnerability for a browser can
cost 100,000 USD and sell for a million dollars if it is chained
with a kernel exploit to remotely jailbreak iOS [59].
Among many components of web browsers, a JavaScript
(JS) engine is of particular interest to attackers as its Turing-
complete nature enables attackers to craft sophisticated ex-
ploits. One can easily allocate a series of heap chunks to
perform heap spraying [49], write functions in JS to abstract
away some exploitation logic [26], and even bypass the miti-
gation used in modern web browsers [35]. According to the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD), 43% of the total vul-
nerabilities reported for Microsoft Edge and Google Chrome
in 2017 were JS engine vulnerabilities.
Despite the increasing attention, there has been relatively
little academic research on analyzing JS engine vulnerabilities
compared to other studies seeking to find them [18, 24, 54].
LangFuzz [24] combines code fragments extracted from JS
seed files to generate JS test inputs. GramFuzz and IFuzzer
employ more or less the same approach [18, 54], but IFuzzer
uses evolutionary guidance to improve the fuzzing effective-
ness with genetic programming based on the feedback ob-
tained by executing a target JS engine with produced inputs.
However, none of the existing approaches consider the re-
lationship between code fragments for generating test inputs.
In other words, they produce test inputs by simply combin-
ing fragments as long as JS grammars allow it. Thus, they
do not determine which combination is likely to reveal vul-
nerabilities from the target JS engine. Are there any similar
patterns between JS test inputs that trigger JS engine vulnera-
bilities? If so, can we leverage such patterns to drive fuzzers
to find security vulnerabilities? These are the key questions
that motivated our research.
We performed a preliminary study on JS engine vulnera-
bilities and observed two patterns. We observed that a new
security problem often arises from JS engine files that have
been patched for a different bug. We analyzed 50 CVEs as-
signed to ChakraCore, a JS engine used by Microsoft Edge.
We found that 18% and 14% of the vulnerabilities were related
to GlobOpt.cpp and JavascriptArray.cpp, respectively.
The second observation was that JS test code that triggers
new security vulnerabilities is often composed of code frag-
ments that already exist in regression tests. We collected 2,038
unique JS files from the ChakraCore regression test suite and
67 JS files that invoked the analyzed vulnerabilities. These
two sets of files were disjoint. We sliced the AST of each
JS file into AST subtrees of depth one, called fragments. We
then computed the number of overlapping fragments between
the two sets; we found that 95.9% of the fragments extracted
from the 67 vulnerability-triggering JS files overlapped with
the fragments extracted from the regression test suite (see §3).
Given these two observations, how do we perform fuzz
testing to find JS engine vulnerabilities? For this research
question, we propose the first approach that leverages a neu-
ral network language model (NNLM) to conduct fuzz testing
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on a target JS engine. Our key idea is to mutate a given regres-
sion JS test by replacing its partial code with new code that
the NNLM creates. Consider a regression JS test that invokes
a patched functionality. We generate a JS test from this re-
gression test while expecting to elicit a new potential bug that
resides in the patched JS engine files, thus addressing the first
observation. We also assemble existing code from regression
test suites under the guidance of the NNLM when composing
new partial code. This captures the second observation.
To manifest this idea, we designed and implemented Mon-
tage, a system for finding security vulnerabilities in JS en-
gines. The system starts by transforming the AST of each
JS test from a given regression test suite into the sequence
of fragments. These fragment sequences become training
instances over which the NNLM is trained. Therefore, the
NNLM learns the relationships between fragments. Montage
mutates a given JS test by reconstructing one of its subtrees
as the trained NNLM guides.
Previous research focused on learning the relationships
between PDF objects [16], characters [11, 32], and lexical
tokens in the source code [22,40,43]. These language models
addressed completing incorrect or missing tokens [40, 53], or
assembling PDF objects [16]. Their methods are not directly
applicable to generating valid JS tests, which requires model-
ing structural control flows and semantic data dependencies
among JS lexical tokens. Liu et al. [32] stated their limitation
in extracting general patterns from character-level training
instances from C code, thus generating spurious tests.
Unlike these previous studies [11, 16], Montage uses frag-
ments as building blocks. Each fragment encapsulates the
structural relationships among nodes within an AST unit tree.
The model is then trained to learn the relationships between
such AST unit trees. Montage uses this model to assemble
unit subtrees when mutating a given regression JS test. Thus,
each generated JS test reflects the syntactic and semantic
commonalities that exist in the regression test suite.
We evaluated Montage to find bugs in ChakraCore 1.4.1
and compared the number of found bugs against CodeAl-
chemist [20], jsfunfuzz [38], and IFuzzer [54]. We performed
five fuzzing campaigns; each round ran for 72 hours. Mon-
tage found 133 bugs, including 15 security bugs. Among the
found security bugs, Montage reported 9, 12, and 12 bugs that
CodeAlchemist, jsfunfuzz, and IFuzzer did not find, respec-
tively. This result demonstrates that Montage is able to find
bugs that the state-of-the-art JS fuzzers are unable to find.
We measured the efficacy of the Montage language model
against the random selection method with no language model,
Markov-chain model, and the character/token-level recurrent
neural network language model. Montage outperformed the
other approaches in terms of finding unique bugs.
We further tested Montage to fuzz the latest versions of
ChakraCore, JavaScriptCore, SpiderMonkey, and V8. Mon-
tage found 37 unique bugs, including three security bugs.
34 bugs were found from ChakraCore. The remaining two
and one bugs were from JavaScriptCore and V8, respectively.
Of these three security bugs, Montage discovered one from
JavaScriptCore and the other two from ChakraCore. These
results demonstrate the effectiveness of leveraging NNLMs
in finding real-world JS engine bugs.
2 Background
2.1 Language Model
A language model is a probability distribution over sequences
of words. It is essential for natural language processing (NLP)
tasks, such as speech recognition, machine translation, and
text generation. Traditionally, language models estimate the
likelihood of a word sequence given its occurrence history in
a training set.
An n-gram language model [8, 30] approximates this prob-
ability based on the occurrence history of the preceding n−1
words. Unfortunately, such count-based language models in-
herently suffer from the data sparsity problem [8], which
causes them to yield poor predictions. The problem is mainly
due to insufficient representative training instances. NNLMs
address the data sparsity problem by representing words as a
distributed vector representation, which is often called a word
embedding, and using it as input into a neural network.
Bengio et al. [3] introduced the first NNLM, a feed-forward
neural network (FNN) model. An FNN predicts the next word
based on its preceding n−1 words, which is called a history
or a context where n is a hyper parameter that represents the
size of the word sequence [1,3,17]. In this NNLM setting, all
words in a training set constitute a vocabulary V . Each word
in V is mapped onto a feature vector. Therefore, a context, a
word sequence, becomes the concatenation of each feature
vector corresponding to its word. The model is then trained
to output a conditional probability distribution of words in V
for the next word from a given context.
Long short-term memory (LSTM). Unlike FNN language
models, a recurrent neural network (RNN) is capable of pre-
dicting the next word from a history of preceding words of an
arbitrary length because an RNN is capable of accumulating
information over a long history of words. An LSTM model is
a special kind of RNN; it is designed to capture long-term de-
pendencies between words [14, 23]. Because a standard RNN
suffers from the gradient vanishing/exploding problem [4],
an LSTM model uses neural layers called gates to regulate
information propagation and internal memory to update its
training parameters over multiple time steps.
2.2 JS Engine Fuzzing
Fuzz testing is a form of dynamic software testing in which
the program under test runs repeatedly with test inputs in
order to discover bugs in the program. Fuzzing can be catego-
rized into two types based on their input generation method-
ology [50]: mutational fuzzing and generational fuzzing. Mu-
tational fuzzing [7, 44, 57, 58] alters given seeds to generate
new test inputs, whereas generational fuzzing [19, 20, 24, 38]
produces tests based on an input model, such as a grammar.
Since JS code is highly structured, randomly generated test
inputs are likely to be rejected by JS engines. Therefore, it
is common for JS engine fuzzers to employ a generational
approach. One notable example is jsfunfuzz, a seminal JS
engine fuzzer [38, 45]. It starts with a start symbol defined
in a JS grammar and selects the next potential production in
a random fashion until there are no remaining non-terminal
symbols. CodeAlchemist [20] is another generational fuzzer
that resort to the assembly constraints of its building blocks
called code bricks to produce semantically valid JS code.
Most other JS engine fuzzers use both mutational and gen-
erational approaches. LangFuzz [24], GramFuzz [18], and
IFuzzer [54] parse JS seeds with the JS grammar and con-
struct a pool of code fragments, where a code fragment is a
subtree of an AST. They combine code fragments in the pool
to produce a new JS test input, but they also mutate given
seeds to generate test inputs.
Although it does not aim to find security vulnerabilities,
TreeFuzz [41] leverages a probabilistic context-free grammar
(PCFG) to generate a test suite from given seeds. Similarly,
Skyfire [56] infers a probabilistic context-sensitive grammar
(PCSG) from given seeds and uses it to generate a well-
distributed set of seeds. Both approaches apply probabilistic
language models to generate JS testing inputs, but their design
is too generic to find security vulnerabilities in JS engines. Un-
like previous approaches, Montage is inspired by a systematic
study of CVEs, i.e., previous JS engine vulnerabilities, and
leverages an NNLM trained to learn syntactic and semantic
commonalities between JS regression test suites.
3 Motivation
Can we find similarities between JS files that trigger secu-
rity vulnerabilities? We answer this question by conducting
a quantitative study of analyzing reported CVEs and corre-
sponding proof of concept (PoC) exploits for ChakraCore [10].
We chose ChakraCore because its GitHub repository main-
tains well-documented commit logs describing whether a
specific CVE is patched by a commit. This helps us identify
which security vulnerability is related to a given PoC exploit
and which source lines are affected by the vulnerability. Other
JS engines, in contrast, have not provided an exact mapping
between a code commit and a CVE.
Note that collecting PoC exploits is not straightforward be-
cause CVE reports typically do not carry any PoC exploits due
to the potential risk of being abused. We manually collected
CVEs as well as their PoC code from exploitDB, vulnera-
bility blogs, and the ChakraCore GitHub repository. In total,
we obtained 67 PoC exploits, each of which corresponds to
a unique CVE. We further identified 50 of them where the
corresponding vulnerabilities are fixed by a single commit.
This means that we can map each of the 50 vulnerabilities
to a set of affected source files. The earliest and the latest
vulnerabilities in the collected set were patched in September
2016 and March 2018, respectively. In total, 77 files were
patched owing to these vulnerabilities.
We found that nine out of the 50 vulnerabilities (18%) are
related to the GlobOpt.cpp file, which mainly implements
the just-in-time (JIT) compilation step. Seven of them (14%)
have also contributed to patching the JavascriptArray.cpp
file. Note that each file implements different functionalities of
ChakraCore. In other words, different JS engine vulnerabili-
ties often arise from a common file that implements the same
functionalities, such as JIT optimization and JS arrays. For
example, a patch for CVE-2018-0776 forces a deep copy of an
array when the array is accessed via the function arguments
property within a callee, thus avoiding a type confusion vul-
nerability. However, the patch was incomplete, still leaving
other ways in which a shallow copy of arrays could be caused.
CVE-2018-0933 and CVE-2018-0934 were assigned to those
bugs. Note that all the patches revised the BoxStackInstance
function in the JavascriptArray.cpp file.
Among the 77 patched files, 26 (33.8%) files are patched
at least twice due to the reported CVEs. These examples
demonstrate that JS engine vulnerabilities often arise from
files that were patched for other bugs. Considering that these
patches are often checked with regression tests, mutating an
existing JS test may trigger a new vulnerability whose root
cause lies in the patched files that this test already covered.
Observation 1. JS engine vulnerabilities often arise from
the same file patched for different bugs.
We also measured the syntactic similarity between JS code
from the PoC exploits and 2,038 JS files obtained from re-
gression test suites maintained by ChakraCore. Note that a
regression test suite consists of JS tests that trigger previously
patched bugs and check expected outcomes with adversarial
test input. In particular, we gathered the regression test files
from the ChakraCore version released in August 2016, which
is one month ahead of the patching date of the earliest vulner-
ability. Therefore, the regression test files were not affected
by any of the studied vulnerabilities.
1 var v0 = {};
2 for (var v1 = 0; v1 < 5; v1++) {
3 v0[v1] = v1 + 5;
4 }
Figure 1: Example of a normalized JS file.
To measure the similarity, we normalized the identifiers in
the regression test files as well as the PoC exploits. Specifi-
cally, we renamed each identifier for variables and functions
to have a sequential number and a common prefix as their
name. We then parsed the normalized JS files down to ASTs.
We extracted a set of unit subtrees with a depth of one
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Figure 2: Fragmentizing an AST from the example in Fig-
ure 1.
from each AST. For a given AST, we extracted a unit subtree
from each internal node. Thus, the number of extracted unit
subtrees becomes the number of AST internal nodes. We call
such a unit subtree a fragment, as formally defined in §5. Note
that the root node of each fragment is an internal node of the
AST. It also corresponds to a leaf node in another fragment,
except the fragment with the root node of the original AST.
Figure 2 illustrates the fragmentation results for a JS file
listed in Figure 1. The upper side of the figure shows an AST
subtree obtained from the Esprima JS parser [21]. This subtree
corresponds to Line 3. The bottom of the figure presents
fragments from this subtree.
We also divided each PoC that triggers a CVE into frag-
ments and then counted how many fragments existed in the
regression test suites. Figure 3 depicts the number of PoC files
whose common fragment percentage is over each percentage
threshold. We found that all the fragments (100%) from 10
PoC exploits already existed in the regression test files. More
than 96% of the fragments in the 42 PoC exploits and 90% of
the fragments in the 63 PoC exploits existed in the regression
test as well. On average, 95.9% of the fragments from the
PoC exploits were found in the regression test files.
Observation 2. More than 95% of the fragments syntac-
tically overlap between the regression tests and the PoC
exploits.
Both observations imply that it is likely to trigger a new
security vulnerability by assembling code fragments from
existing regression test suites, which is the primary motivation
for this study, as we describe in §4.
4 Overview
We present Montage, an NNLM-driven fuzzer, which auto-
matically finds bugs in JS engines. Recall that the overall
design of Montage is driven by two observations: (1) secu-
rity bugs often arise from files that were previously patched
for different causes, and (2) the JS test code that triggers
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Figure 3: The number of all PoC files whose common frag-
ment percentages are greater than varying percentages.
security-related bugs heavily reuses AST fragments found in
the existing regression test sets.
We propose a novel fuzzing technique that captures these
observations. We train an NNLM to capture the syntactic and
semantic relationships among fragments from the regression
test sets. When generating a new JS test, Montage mutates the
AST of a given JS regression test. It replaces a subtree of the
AST with a new subtree, using the trained NNLM. Thus, each
generated test stems from a given regression test that checks
previously patched or buggy logic, thereby, capturing the first
observation. At the same time, it invokes functionalities in
different execution contexts by assembling existing fragments
under the guidance of the NNLM, which addresses the second
observation.
Figure 4 shows the overall workflow of Montage. Phase
I prepares the training instances from given regression test
suites. Each training instance is a sequence of AST unit sub-
trees, called fragments. Phase II trains an NNLM that learns
compositional relationships among fragments. These two
phases are one-time setup procedures. Phase III generates
JS tests by leveraging the trained model.
JS’JS
,
,
,
Phase I
Building training data
Phase II
Training LSTM model
Phase III
Generating JS tests
Figure 4: Overview of Montage.
Phase I begins with a given training set of JS regression
test files. It parses each JS file into an AST and normalizes
identifiers that appeared in the AST to deduplicate function
and variable names. Figure 1 shows a normalized JS file
example. Each appeared variable name is changed into a
common name, such as v0 or v1. From a normalized AST tree,
Phase I then extracts multiple unit subtrees, each of which
is called a fragment. For each node in the AST, Montage
recursively slices a unit subtree of depth one. Each of the
sliced subtrees becomes a fragment of the AST. It then emits
the sequence of these fragments, produced by the pre-order
traversal of their root nodes in the normalized AST tree.
Phase II trains the NNLM given a set of fragment se-
quences. From a given fragment sequence of an arbitrary
length, we design the NNLM to suggest the next fragments,
which are likely to appear after this fragment sequence. This
framing is a key contribution of this paper. Note that it is not
straightforward to model the inherent structural relationships
of an AST in such a way that a language model can learn.
By leveraging the fragments encapsulating the structural re-
lationships of ASTs, we encode a given AST into fragment
sequences. Considering that a vast volume of natural language
NNLMs have been trained upon word sequences, this frag-
ment sequencing eases the application of existing prevailing
NNLMs for generating JS tests.
Here, the objective is to train the NNLM to learn com-
positional relationships among fragments so that the JS test
code generated from the trained model reflects the syntax and
semantics of the given training set, which is the regression
testing set of JS engines.
Phase III generates a new JS test by leveraging the trained
model and the AST of a regression test. Given a set of ASTs
from regression test suites, it randomly picks a seed AST.
Then, it randomly selects a subtree for Montage to replace.
When generating a new subtree, Montage considers a con-
text, the sequence of all fragments that precedes the selected
subtree. Montage iteratively appends fragments from the root
node of the selected subtree while considering its context.
Because the current AST is assembled from fragments, it
is expected that some variables and function identifiers in the
AST nodes are used without proper declarations. Montage,
thus, resolves possible reference errors by renaming them
with the declared identifiers. Finally, Montage checks the
generated test and reports a bug if the code crashes the target
JS engine.
Other model guided approaches. Previous studies pre-
sented language models, which can predict the lexical code
tokens in source code. Such framing of language models
has been vastly studied while addressing code completion
problems [40, 53]. However, the generation of an executable
test is more challenging than the code completion problem
that predicts a limited number of semantically correct lex-
ical tokens. To our knowledge, the PDF fuzzer proposed
by Singh et al. [16] is the first system that employs a
character-level RNN model to generate PDF tests. We eval-
uated whether our fragment-based approach performs better
than the character-level RNN model approach in finding JS
engine bugs (see §7.5).
5 Design
The design goal of Montage is to generate JS test inputs
that can trigger security vulnerabilities in JS engines, which
(1) reflect the syntactic and semantic patterns of a given JS
training set, and (2) trigger no reference errors.
It is a technical challenge to frame the problem of teach-
ing a language model the semantic and syntactic patterns of
training code. We address this challenge by abstracting the
hierarchical structure by AST subtrees, which we refer to as
fragments. We then enable the language model to learn the
compositional relationships between fragments.
We propose a novel code generation algorithm that lever-
ages a trained language model. We harness an existing JS
code that is already designed to trigger JS engine defects.
Montage alters this existing JS code by replacing one of its
AST subtrees with a new subtree that the trained language
model generates. Thus, Montage is capable of generating a
new JS test, semantically similar to the regression test case
that triggers a previously reported bug. We expect that this
new JS test triggers a new bug in a different execution context.
5.1 Phase I: Building Training Data of Frag-
ment Sequences
Phase I prepares training instances using a given training set.
It conducts parsing and fragmentation.
5.1.1 Parsing and Normalizing
Phase I builds an AST by parsing each JS file in a training
set and normalizes the parsed AST. Because the training set
includes a variety of JS files from various developers, iden-
tifier naming practices are not necessarily consistent. Thus,
it is natural that the training files have diverse variable and
function names across different JS files. Consider two JS files
that contain a JS statement var b = a + 1 and var c =
d + 1, respectively. Both have the same AST structure and
semantics, but different identifiers.
This pattern increases the size of unnecessary vocabulary
for a language model to learn, rendering the model evaluation
expensive as it requires more training instances. To have
concise ASTs with consistent identifier names, we rename all
the variable and function identifiers in the ASTs.
Specifically, for each declared variable identifier, we as-
sign a sequential number in the order of their appearance in
a given AST. We then replace each variable name with a
new name that combines a common prefix and its sequential
number, such as v0 and v1. We also apply the same proce-
dure to function identifiers, e.g., f0 and f1. We deliberately
exclude language-specific built-in functions and engine ob-
jects from the normalization step as normalizing them affects
the semantics of the original AST. For an eval function that
dynamically evaluates a given string as the JS code, we first
extract the argument string of the eval function and strip it
out as the JS code when the argument is a constant string.
Subsequently, we normalize identifiers in the JS code stripped
out from the eval argument.
As our training set is derived from regression tests of JS
engines, JS files in the set make heavy use of predefined
functions for testing purposes. Therefore, we manually identi-
fied such vendor-provided testing functions and ignore them
during the normalization step. That is, we treated common
testing functions provided by each JS engine vendor as a
built-in function and excluded them from normalization.
5.1.2 Fragmentation
Montage slices each normalized AST into a set of subtrees
while ensuring that the depth of each subtree is one. We call
such a unit subtree as a fragment.
We represent an AST T with a triple (N,E,n0), where N
is the set of nodes in T , E is the set of edges in T , and n0 is
the root node of T . We denote the immediate children of a
given AST node ni by C (ni), where ni is a node in N. Then,
we define a subtree of T where the root node of the subtree is
ni. When there is such a subtree with a depth of one, we call
it a fragment. We now formally define it as follows.
Definition 1 (Fragment). A fragment of T = (N,E,n0) is a
subtree Ti = (Ni,Ei,ni), where
• ni ∈ N s.t. C (ni) 6= /0.
• Ni = {ni}⋃C(ni).
• Ei = {(ni,n′) | n′ =C(ni)}.
Intuitively, a fragment whose root node is ni contains its
children and their tree edges. Note that each fragment in-
herently captures an exercised production rule of the JS lan-
guage grammar employed to parse the AST. We also de-
fine the type of a fragment as the non-terminal symbol of
its root node ni. For instance, the first fragment at the bot-
tom side of Figure 2 corresponds to the assignment expres-
sion statement in Line 3 of Figure 1. The fragment possesses
four nodes whose root node is the non-terminal symbol of
an AssignmentExpression, which becomes the type of this
fragment.
Montage then generates a sequence of fragments by per-
forming the pre-order traversal on the AST. When visiting
each node in the AST, it emits the fragment whose root is the
visited node. The purpose of the pre-order sequencing is to
sort fragments by the order of their appearance in the original
AST. For example, the bottom side of Figure 2 shows the
sequence of seven fragments obtained from the AST subtree
in the figure.
We model the compositional relationships between frag-
ments as a pre-order sequencing of fragments so that an
NNLM can predict the next fragment to use based on the
fragments appearing syntactically ahead. In summary, Phase
I outputs the list of fragment sequences from the training set
of normalized ASTs.
LSTM
ht
fr1
LSTM
h1
LSTM
fr0
h0
…
Tt+1
f(x)
frt
LSTM
Pt+1
Figure 5: Architecture of Montage LSTM model. ⊕ in the
figure denotes a concatenation.
5.2 Phase II: Training an LSTM Model
All distinct fragments become our vocabulary for the NNLM
to be trained. Before training, we label the fragments whose
frequency is less than five in the training set as out-of-
vocabulary (OoV). This is a standard procedure for building
a language model to prune insignificant words [22, 40, 43].
Each fragment sequence represents a JS file in the training
set. This sequence becomes a training instance. We build
a statistical language model from training instances so that
the model can predict the next fragment based on all of its
preceding fragments, which is considered as a context. This
way, the model considers each fragment as a lexicon, and
thereby, suggests the next probable fragments based on the
current context.
Training objectives. The overall objective is to model a
function f : X → Y such that y ∈ Y is a probability distribu-
tion for the next fragment f rt+1, given a fragment sequence
x = [ f r0, f r1, ..., f rt ] ∈ X , where f ri denotes each fragment
at time step i. Given x, the model is trained to (1) predict the
correct next fragment with the largest probability output and
(2) prioritize fragments that share the same type with the true
fragment over other types of fragments. Note that this training
objective accords with our code generation algorithm in that
Montage randomly selects the next fragment of a given type
from the top k suggestions (see §5.3).
LSTM. To implement such a statistical language model, we
take advantage of the LSTM model [23]. Figure 5 depicts the
architecture of Montage LSTM model. Our model consists
of one projection, one LSTM, and one output layers. The
projection layer is an embedding layer for the vocabulary
where each fragment has a dimension size of 32. When f rt
is passed into the model, it is converted into a vector, called
embedding, after passing the projection layer.
Then, the embedding vector becomes one of the inputs for
the LSTM layer with a hidden state size of 32. At each time
step, the LSTM cell takes three inputs: (1) a hidden state ht−1
and (2) a cell state ct−1 from the previous time step; and (3)
the embedding of a new input fragment. This architecture
enables the model to predict the next fragment based on the
cumulative history of preceding fragments. In other words,
the LSTM model is not limited to considering a fixed number
of preceding fragments, which is an advantage of using an
RNN model.
The output of the LSTM layer ht is then concatenated with
two other vectors: (1) the type embedding Tt+1 of the next
fragment, and (2) the fragment embedding Pt+1 of the parent
fragment of the next fragment in its AST. The concatenated
vector is now fed into the final output layer and it outputs a
vector f (x) of vocabulary size to predict the next fragment.
Loss function. To address our training objectives, we defined
a new loss function that rewards the model to locate type-
relevant fragments in its top suggestions. The LSTM model
is trained to minimize the following empirical loss over the
training set (x,y) ∈ D.
g(x) = softmax( f (x))
LD( f ) =
1
|D| ∑
(x,y)∈D
l1(g(x),y)+ l2(g(x),y)
(1)
As shown in Equation 1, the loss function has two terms: l1
and l2. Note that these terms are designed to achieve our two
training objectives, respectively.
l1(g(x),y) =−
N
∑
i=1
yi logg(x)i
l2(g(x),y) = ∑
i∈top(n)
g(x)i− ∑
j∈type(y)
g(x) j,
(2)
Equation 2 describes each term in detail. In the equation, n
denotes the number of fragments whose types are same as that
of the true fragment. top(n) and type(y) indicate functions
that return the indices of top n fragments and fragments of
the true type, respectively.
l1 is a cross entropy loss function, which has been used for
common natural language models [29, 34]. l2 is employed for
rewarding the model to prioritize fragments that have the same
type as the true fragment. We formally define l2 as a type
error. It is a gap between two values: the sum of the model
output probabilities corresponding to (1) top n fragments and
(2) fragments of the true type.
By reducing the sum of l1 and l2 while training, the model
achieves our training objectives. Intuitively, the LSTM model
is trained not only to predict the correct fragment for a given
context, but also to locate fragments whose types are same as
the correct fragment in its top suggestions.
The fundamental difference of Montage from previous ap-
proaches that use probabilistic language models [41,56] lies in
the use of fragments. To generate JS code, TreeFuzz [41] and
SkyFire [56] use a PCFG and PCSG to choose the next AST
production rule from a given AST node, respectively. SkyFire
defines its context to be sibling and parent nodes from a given
AST. It picks an AST production rule that is less frequent in
the training set. In contrast, Montage selects a fragment based
on the list of fragments, not AST nodes. Therefore, Montage
is capable of capturing the global composition relationships
among code fragments to select the next code fragment. Fur-
thermore, Montage preserves the semantics in the training
set by slicing the AST nodes into fragments, which is used
as a lexicon for generating JS code. We frame the problem
of training a language model to leverage fragments and their
sequences, which makes Montage compatible with prevalent
statistical language models.
5.3 Phase III: Generating JS Tests
Given a set of ASTs from regression tests and the LSTM
model, Phase III first mutates a randomly selected seed AST
by leveraging the LSTM model. Then, it resolves reference
errors in the skeleton AST.
Algorithm 1 describes our code generation algorithm. The
MutateAST function takes two configurable parameters from
users.
fmax The maximum number of fragments to append.
This parameter controls the maximum number
of fragments that a newly composed subtree can
have.
ktop The number of candidate fragments. Montage ran-
domly selects the next fragment from suggestions
of the ktop largest probabilities at each iteration.
After several exploratory experiments, we observed that
bloated ASTs are more likely to have syntactical and seman-
tic errors. We also observed that the accuracy of the model
decreases as the size of an AST increases. That is, as the size
of AST increases, Montage has a higher chance of failures in
generating valid JS tests. We thus capped the maximum num-
ber of fragment insertions with fmax and empirically chose its
default value to be 100. For ktop, we elaborate on its role and
effects in detail in §7.3.
5.3.1 Mutating a Seed AST
The MutateAST function takes in a set of ASTs from regres-
sion tests, the trained LSTM model, and the two parameters. It
then begins by randomly selecting a seed AST from the given
set (Line 2). From the seed AST, it removes one randomly
selected subtree (Line 3). Note that the pruned AST becomes
a base for the new JS test. Finally, it composes a new subtree
by leveraging the LSTM model (Lines 4-13) and returns the
newly composed AST.
After selecting a seed AST in Line 2, we randomly prune
one subtree from the AST by invoking the RemoveSubtree
function. The function returns a pruned AST and the initial
context for the LSTM model, which is a fragment sequence
up to the fragment where Montage should start to generate a
new subtree. This step makes a room to compose new code.
In the while loop in Lines 4-13, the MutateAST function
now iteratively appends fragments to the AST at most fmax
times by leveraging the LSTM model. The loop starts by se-
lecting the next fragment via the PickNextFrag function in
Line 6. The PickNextFrag function first queries the LSTM
model to retrieve the ktop suggestions. From the suggestions,
Algorithm 1: Mutating a seed AST
Input : A set of ASTs from regression tests (T).
The LSTM model trained on fragments (model).
The max number of fragments to append ( fmax).
The number of candidate fragments (ktop).
Output : A newly composed AST.
1 function MutateAST(T, model, fmax, ktop)
2 n0← PickRandomSeed(T)
3 n0, context← RemoveSubtree(n0)
4 count← 0
5 while count ≤ fmax do
6 next_ f rag← PickNextFrag(model, ktop, context)
7 if next_ f rag =∅ then
8 return
9 n0← AppendFrag(n0, next_ f rag)
10 if not IsASTBroken(n0) then
11 break
12 context.append(next_ f rag)
13 count← count+1
14 return n0
15 function AppendFrag(node, next_ f rag)
16 C← node.child() /* Get direct child nodes. */
17 if IsNonTerminal(node) ∧ C=∅ then
18 node← next_ f rag
19 return
20 for c ∈ C do
21 AppendFrag(c, f rag_seq)
the function repeats random selections until the chosen frag-
ment indeed has a correct type required for the next fragment.
If all the suggested fragments do not have the required type,
the MutateAST function stops here and abandon the AST.
Otherwise, it continues to append the chosen fragment by
invoking the AppendFrag function.
The AppendFrag function traverses the AST in the pre-
order to find where to append the fragment. Note that this
process is exactly the opposite process of an AST fragmenta-
tion in §5.1.2. Because we use a consistent traversal order in
Phase I and III, we can easily find whether the current node
is where the next fragment should be appended. Lines 16-19
summarize how the function determines it. The function tests
whether the current node is a non-terminal that does not have
any children. If the condition meets, it appends the fragment
to the current node and returns. If not, it iteratively invokes
itself over the children of the node for the pre-order traversal.
Note that the presence of a non-terminal node with no
children indicates that the fragment assembly of the AST is
still in progress. The IsASTBroken function checks whether
the AST still holds such nodes. If so, it keeps appending the
fragments. Otherwise, the MutateAST function returns the
composed skeleton AST.
We emphasize that our code generation technique based
on code fragments greatly simplifies factors that a language
model should learn in order to generate an AST. TreeFuzz [41]
allows a model to learn fine-grained relationships among
edges, nodes, and predecessors in an AST. Their approach
requires to produce multiple models each of which covers a
specific property that the model should learn. This, though,
brings the unfortunate side-effects of managing multiple mod-
els and deciding priorities in generating an AST when the
predictions from different models conflict with each other.
On the other hand, our approach abstracts such relationships
as fragments, which becomes building blocks for generating
AST. The model only learns the compositional relationships
between such blocks, which makes training and managing a
language model simple.
5.3.2 Resolving Reference Errors
Phase III resolves the reference errors from the generated
AST, which appear when there is a reference to an undeclared
identifier. It is natural for the generated AST to have reference
errors since we assembled fragments that are used in different
contexts across various training files. The reference error
resolution step is designed to increase the chance of triggering
bugs by making a target JS engine fully exercise the semantics
of a generated testing code. The previous approaches [18,
24, 54] reuse existing AST subtrees and attach them into a
new AST, which naturally causes reference errors. However,
they overlooked this reference error resolution step without
addressing a principled solution.
We propose a systematic way of resolving reference errors,
which often accompany type errors. Specifically, we take into
account both (1) statically inferred JS types and (2) the scopes
of declared identifiers. Montage harnesses these two factors
to generate JS test cases with fewer reference errors in the run
time.
There are three technical challenges that make resolving
reference errors difficult. (1) In JS, variables and functions
can be referenced without their preceding declarations due
to hoisting [37]. Hoisting places the declarations of identi-
fiers at the top of the current scope in its execution context;
(2) It is difficult to statically infer the precise type of each
variable without executing the JS code because of no-strict
type checking and dynamically changing types; and (3) Each
variable has its own scope so that referencing a live variable
is essential to resolve reference errors.
To address these challenges, Montage prepares a scope for
each AST node that corresponds to a new block body. Mon-
tage then starts traversing from these nodes and fills the scope
with declared identifiers including hoistable declarations.
Each declared identifier in its scope holds the undefined
type at the beginning.
When Montage encounters an assignment expression in its
traversal, it statically infers the type of its right-hand expres-
sion via its AST node type and assigns the inferred type to its
left-hand variable. Montage covers the following statically in-
ferred types: array, boolean, function, null, number,
object, regex, string, undefined, and unknown. Each
scope has an identifier map whose key is a declared identifier
and value is an inferred type of the declared identifier.
To resolve reference errors, Montage identifies an unde-
clared variable while traversing each AST node and then
infers the type of this undeclared variable based on its us-
age. A property or member method reference of such an un-
declared variable hints to Montage to infer the type of the
undeclared variable. For instance, the length property ref-
erence of an undeclared variable assigns the string type to
the undeclared variable. From this inferred type, Montage
replaces the undeclared identifier with a declared identifier
when its corresponding type in the identifier map is same as
the inferred type. If the inferred type of an undeclared variable
is unknown, it ignores the type and randomly picks one from
the list of declared identifiers. For all predefined and built-in
identifiers, Montage treats them as declared identifiers.
6 Implementation
We implemented Montage with 3K+ LoC in Python and JS.
We used Esprima 4.0 [21] and Escodegen 1.9.1 [51] for pars-
ing and printing JS code, respectively. As both libraries work
in the Node.js environment, we implemented an inter-process
pipe channel between our fuzzer in Python and the libraries.
We implemented the LSTM models with PyTorch
1.0.0 [52], using the L2 regularization technique with a pa-
rameter of 0.0001. The stochastic gradient descent with a
momentum factor of 0.9 served as an optimizer.
We leveraged the Python subprocess module to execute JS
engines and obtain their termination signals. We only con-
sidered JS test cases that crash with SIGILL and SIGSEGV
meaningful because crashes with other termination signals
are usually intended ones by developers.
To support open science and further research, we publish
Montage at https://github.com/WSP-LAB/Montage.
7 Evaluation
We evaluated Montage in several experimental settings. The
goal is to measure the efficacy of Montage in finding JS engine
bugs, as well as to demonstrate the necessity of an NNLM
in finding bugs. We first describe the dataset that we used
and the experimental environment. Then, we demonstrate (1)
how good a trained Montage NNLM is in predicting correct
fragments (§7.2), (2) how we set a ktop parameter for efficient
fuzzing (§7.3), (3) how many different bugs Montage discov-
ers, which other existing fuzzers are unable to find (§7.4),
and (4) how much the model contributes to Montage finding
bugs and generating valid JS tests (§7.5). We conclude the
evaluation with field tests on the latest JS engines (§7.6). We
also discuss case studies of discovered bugs (§7.7).
7.1 Experimental Setup
We conducted experiments on two machines running 64-bit
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS with two Intel E5-2699 v4 (2.2 GHz) CPUs
(88 cores), eight GTX Titan XP DDR5X GPUs, and 512 GB
of main memory.
Target JS engine. The ChakraCore GitHub repository has
managed the patches for all the reported CVEs by the commit
messages since 2016. That is, we can identify the patched
version of ChakraCore for each known CVE and have ground
truth that tells whether found crashes correspond to one of
the known CVEs [9]. Therefore, we chose an old version
of ChakraCore as our target JS engine. We specifically per-
formed experiments on ChakraCore 1.4.1, which was the first
stable version after January 31, 2017.
Data. Our dataset is based on the regression test sets of
Test262 [13] and the four major JS engine repositories at
the version of January 31, 2017: ChakraCore, JavaScriptCore,
SpiderMonkey, and V8. We excluded test files that Chakra-
Core failed to execute because of their engine-specific syntax
and built-in objects. We did not take into account files larger
than 30 KB because large files considerably increase the
number of unique fragments with low frequency. In total, we
collected 1.7M LoC of 33,486 unique JS files.
Temporal relationships. Montage only used the regression
test files committed before January 31, 2017, and performed
fuzz testing campaigns on the first stable version after January
31, 2017. Thus, the bugs that regression tests in the training
dataset check and the bugs that Montage is able to find are
disjoint. We further confirmed that all CVEs that Montage
found were patched after January 31, 2017.
Fragments. From the dataset, we first fragmented ASTs to
collect 134,160 unique fragments in total. On average, each
training instance consisted of 118 fragments. After replacing
less frequent fragments with OoVs, they were reduced to
14,518 vocabularies. Note that most replaced fragments were
string literals, e.g., bug summaries, or log messages.
Bug ground truth. Once Montage found a JS test triggering
a bug, we ran the test against every patched version of Chakra-
Core to confirm whether the found bug matches one of the
reported CVEs. This methodology is well-aligned with that of
Klees et al. [31], which suggests counting distinct bugs using
ground truth. When there is no match, the uniqueness of a
crash was determined by its instruction pointer address with-
out address space layout randomization (ASLR). We chose
this conservative setting to avoid overcounting the number of
found bugs [36].
7.2 Evaluation of the LSTM Model
To train and evaluate the LSTM model of Montage, we per-
formed a 10-fold cross-validation on our dataset. We first
randomly selected JS files for the test set, which accounted
for 10% of the entire dataset. We then randomly split the
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Figure 6: Perplexity and type error proportion of the LSTM
model measured against the training and validation sets over
epochs. They are averaged across the 10 cross-validation sets.
remaining files into 10 groups. We repeated holding out one
group for the validation set and taking the rest of them for the
training set for 10 times.
Figure 6 illustrates the perplexity and type error of the
LSTM model measured on the training and validation sets.
Recall that the loss function of the model is a sum of the log
perplexity and type error (§5.2).
Perplexity. Perplexity measures how well a trained model
predicts the next word that follows given words without per-
plexing. It is a common metric for evaluating natural language
models [29, 34]. A model with a lower perplexity performs
better in predicting the next probable fragment. Note from
Figure 6a that the perplexities for both the training and val-
idation sets decrease without a major difference as training
goes on.
Type error. Type error presents how well our model predicts
the correct type of a next fragment (recall §5.2). A model with
a low type error is capable of predicting the fragments with
the correct type in its top predictions. Note from Figure 6b
that the type errors for both the training and validation sets
continuously decrease and become almost equal as the epoch
increases.
The small differences of each perplexity and type error
between the training set and validation set demonstrate that
our LSTM model is capable of learning the compositional
relations among fragments without overfitting or underfitting.
We further observed that epoch 70 is the optimal point
at which both valid perplexity and valid type errors start to
plateau. We also noticed that the test perplexity and test type
errors at epoch 70 are 28.07 and 0.14, respectively. Note
from Figure 6 that these values are close to those from the
validation set. It demonstrates that the model can accurately
predict fragments from the test set as well. Thus, for the
remaining evaluations, we selected the model trained up to
epoch 70, which took 6.6 hours on our machine.
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Figure 7: The pass rate of generated JS tests over ktop.
7.3 Effect of the ktop Parameter
Montage assembles model-suggested fragments when replac-
ing an AST subtree of a given JS code. In this process, Mon-
tage randomly picks one fragment from the Top-k (ktop) sug-
gestions for each insertion. Our key intuition is that selecting
fragments from the Top-k rather than Top-1 suggestion helps
Montage generate diverse code, which follows the pattern of
JS codes in our dataset but slightly differs from them. We
evaluated the effect of the ktop with seven different values
varying from 1 to 64 to verify our intuition.
We measured the pass rate of generated JS tests. A pass
rate is a measurement unit of demonstrating how many tests a
target JS engine executes without errors among generated test
cases. To measure the pass rate, we first generated 100,000 JS
tests with each ktop value. We only considered five runtime
errors defined by the ECMAScript standard as errors [27].
We then ran Montage for 12 hours with each ktop value to
count the number of crashes found in ChakraCore 1.4.1.
Figures 7 and 8 summarize our two experimental results,
respectively. As shown in Figure 7, the pass rate of Montage
decreases from 79.82% to 58.26% as the ktop increases. This
fact demonstrates that the suggestion from the model con-
siderably affects the generation of executable JS tests. It is
also consistent with the experimental results from Figure 8b,
in that Montage finds fewer total crashes when considering
more fragment suggestions in generating JS tests. Note that
Michael et al. [41] demonstrated that their TreeFuzz achieved
a 14% pass rate, which is significantly lower than that Mon-
tage achieved.
However, note from Figure 8b that the number of unique
crashes increases, as ktop increases, unlike that of total crashes.
This observation supports our intuition that increasing the ktop
helps Montage generate diverse JS tests that trigger undesired
crashes in the JS engines. Figure 8 also shows that Montage
found more crashes from the debug build than the release
build. Moreover, unlike the debug build, the results for the re-
lease build did not show a consistent pattern. We believe these
results are mainly due to the nature of the debug build. It be-
haves more conservatively with inserted assertion statements,
thus producing crashes for every unexpected behavior.
As Klees et al. [31] stated, fuzzers should be evaluated
using the number of unique crashes, not that of crashing in-
puts. For both release and debug builds of ChakraCore 1.4.1,
Table 1: The number of bugs found with four fuzzers and four different approaches: Montage, CodeAlchemist (CA), jsfunfuzz,
and IFuzzer; random selection, Markov chain, char/token-level RNN, and Montage (ktop = 64) without resolving reference errors.
We marked results in bold when the difference between Montage and the other approach is statistically significant.
Build Metric
# of Unique Crashes (Known CVEs)
Montage CA jsfunfuzz IFuzzer random Markov ch-RNN Montage †
Release
Median 23 (7) 15 (4) 27 (3) 4 (1) 12 (3) 19 (6) 1 (0) 12 (4)
Max 26 (8) 15 (4) 31 (4) 4 (2) 15 (4) 22 (7) 1 (1) 13 (5)
Min 20 (6) 14 (3) 25 (3) 0 (0) 10 (3) 16 (5) 0 (0) 11 (4)
Stdev 2.30 0.55 2.19 1.79 2.07 2.39 0.45 0.84(0.84) (0.55) (0.45) (0.71) (0.45) (0.84) (0.55) (0.45)
p-value N/A 0.012 0.029 0.012 0.012 0.037 0.012 0.012(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.144) (0.012) (0.012)
Debug
Median 49 (12) 26 (6) 27 (4) 6 (1) 31 (7) 44 (11) 3 (0) 41 (9)
Max 52 (15) 30 (6) 29 (5) 8 (3) 34 (7) 50 (12) 4 (1) 43 (10)
Min 45 (11) 24 (4) 24 (4) 2 (0) 27 (6) 42 (8) 1 (0) 38 (8)
Stdev 2.70 2.61 2.12 2.41 2.88 3.27 1.10 1.82(1.64) (0.89) (0.45) (1.10) (0.45) (1.67) (0.5) (0.84)
p-value N/A 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.144 0.012 0.012(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.298) (0.012) (0.012)
Both Total 133 (15) 65 (7) 57 (4) 22 (3) 72 (9) 109 (14) 10 (2) 74 (10)Common 36 (8) 22 (2) 17 (3) 1 (0) 29 (6) 37 (8) 1 (0) 37 (7)
† Montage without resolving reference errors.
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Figure 8: The number of total and unique crashes found in
ChakraCore 1.4.1 while varying the ktop.
Montage found the largest number of unique crashes when
the ktop was 64. Therefore, we picked the ktop to be 64 for the
remaining experiments.
7.4 Comparison to State-of-the-art Fuzzers
To verify the ability to find bugs against open-source state-
of-the-art fuzzers, we compared Montage with CodeAl-
chemist [20], jsfunfuzz [38], and IFuzzer [54]. jsfunfuzz and
IFuzzer have been used as a controlled group in the compar-
ison studies [20, 24]. Furthermore, CodeAlchemist, which
assembles its building blocks in a semantics-aware fashion,
and IFuzzer, which employs an evolutionary approach with
genetic programming, have in common with Montage in that
they take in a corpus of JS tests. Since Montage, CodeAl-
chemist, and IFuzzer start from given seed JS files, we fed
them the same dataset collected from the repositories of
Test262 and the four major JS engines. For fair comparison,
we also configured jsfunfuzz to be the version of January 31,
2017, on which we collected our dataset (recall §7.1).
We ran all four fuzzers on ChakraCore 1.4.1 and counted
the number of found unique crashes and known CVEs. Since
most fuzzers depend on random factors, which results in a
high variance of fuzzing results [31], we conducted five trials;
each trial lasted for 6,336 CPU hours (72 hours × 88 cores).
We intentionally chose such a long timeout, because fuzzers
using evolutionary algorithms, such as IFuzzer, could improve
their bug-finding ability as more tests are generated. Note that
we expended a total of 31,680 CPU hours on the five trials
of each fuzzer. Because Montage took 6.6 hours to train its
language model and used this model for the five trials, we set
the timeout of other fuzzers 1.3 hours (6.6 hours / 5 trials)
longer than that of Montage for fair comparison.
The Montage, CA, jsfunfuzz, and IFuzzer columns of Ta-
ble 1 summarize the statistical analysis of the comparison
experimental results. For the release build, Montage found the
largest number of CVEs, whereas jsfunfuzz still discovered
more unique crashes than others. For the debug build, Mon-
tage outperformed all others in finding both unique crashes
and CVEs. We performed two-tailed Mann Whitney U tests
and reported p-values between Montage and the other fuzzers
in the table. We verified that all results are statistically signifi-
cant with p-values less than 0.05.
The last two rows of the table show the number of total and
common bugs found in the five trials from the release and
debug builds, respectively. We counted common bugs when
Montage found these bugs in every run of the five campaigns.
When a bug was found during at least one campaign, they are
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Figure 9: The comparison of unique crashes (known CVEs)
found by Montage, CodeAlchemist (CA), and jsfunfuzz.
counted in the total bugs. Note that Montage found at least
2.14× more CVEs compared to others in a total of the five
trials. We believe that these results explain the significance
of Montage in finding security bugs compared to the other
state-of-the-art fuzzers.
We also compared the bugs discovered by each fuzzer. Fig-
ure 9 depicts the Venn diagrams of unique bugs found in
ChakraCore 1.4.1. These Venn diagrams present the total and
common bugs that each fuzzer found, corresponding to the
last two rows of Table 1. We excluded IFuzzer from the figure
because all found CVEs were also discovered by Montage.
Note from Figure 9a that Montage identified 105 unique
crashes in total, including eight CVEs that were not found by
CodeAlchemist and jsfunfuzz. Furthermore, Montage discov-
ered all CVEs that were commonly found in the five trials of
CodeAlchemist and jsfunfuzz, as shown in Figure 9b. How-
ever, CodeAlchemist and jsfunfuzz also identified a total of
45 and 46 unique bugs that were not found by Montage, re-
spectively. These results demonstrate that Montage plays a
complementary role against the state-of-the-art fuzzers in
finding distinctive bugs.
Performance over time. Figure 10 shows the number of
CVEs that Montage found over time. The number increases
rapidly in the first 1,144 CPU hours (13 hours × 88 cores)
of the fuzzing campaigns; however, Montage finds additional
bugs after running for 2,640 CPU hours (30 hours× 88 cores),
thus becoming slow to find new vulnerabilities.
7.5 Effect of Language Models
Montage generates JS tests by assembling language model-
suggested fragments. Especially, it takes advantage of the
LSTM model to reflect the arbitrary length of preceding frag-
ments when predicting the next relevant fragments. However,
Montage can leverage any other prevailing language models
by its design, and the language model it employs may substan-
tially affect its fuzzing performance. Therefore, to analyze
the efficacy of the LSTM model in finding bugs, we first con-
ducted a comparison study against two other approaches: (1)
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Figure 10: The number of CVEs found by Montage over time.
a random fragment selection, and (2) Markov model-driven
fragment selection.
The former approach is the baseline for Montage where
fragments are randomly appended instead of querying a
model. The latter approach uses a Markov model that makes
a prediction based on the occurrence history of the preceding
two fragments. Specifically, we tailored the code from [25] to
implement the Markov chain.
Additionally, we compared our approach against a
character/token-level RNN language model-guided selection.
It leverages an NNLM to learn the intrinsic patterns from
training instances, which is in common with ours. Recently
proposed approaches [11,16,32], which resort to an NNLM to
generate highly structured inputs, adopted an approach more
or less similar to this one.
Note that there is no publicly available character/token-
level RNN model to generate JS tests. Thus, we referenced the
work of Cummins et al. [11] to implement this approach and
trained the model from scratch. To generate test cases from
the trained model, we referenced the work of Liu et al. [32]
because their approach is based on the seed mutation like our
approach.
The random, Markov, and ch-RNN columns of Table 1 sum-
marize the number of crashes found by each approach. We
conducted five fuzzing campaigns, each of which lasted 72
hours; all the underlying experimental settings are identical
to those in §7.4. Note that we conducted resolving reference
errors and fed the same dataset as Montage when evaluating
the aforementioned three models. Montage outperformed the
random selection and character/token-level RNN methods in
the terms of finding crashes and security bugs; thus, yield-
ing p-values under 0.05, which suggests the superiority of
Montage with statistical significance.
When comparing the metrics from release and debug build
between Montage and the Markov chain approach, Montage
performed better. Montage found more unique bugs in total as
well. However, the Mann Whitney U test deems the difference
insignificant. Nevertheless, we emphasize that Montage is ca-
pable of composing sophisticated subtrees that the Markov
chain easily fails to generate. For instance, Montage gener-
ated a JS test triggering CVE-2017-8729 by appending 54
fragments, which the Markov chain failed to find. We provide
more details of this case in §7.7.1.
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Figure 11: Empirical CDF of the number of appended frag-
ments against JS tests causing crashes in ChakraCore.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the LSTM model, we fur-
ther analyzed the number of fragments Montage appended to
generate JS tests that caused ChakraCore 1.4.1 to crash in the
experiment from §7.4.
Figure 11 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the number of inserted fragments against 169,072 and 5,454
JS tests causing crashes and known CVEs, respectively. For
90% of JS tests that caused the JS engine to crash, Mon-
tage only assembled fewer than 15 fragments; however, it
appended up to 52 fragments to generate 90% of JS tests
that found the known CVEs. This demonstrates that Montage
should append more fragments suggested by the model to
find security bugs rather than non-security bugs. It also de-
notes that the random selection approach suffers from finding
security bugs. Note that Table 1 also accords with this result.
From the aforementioned studies, we conclude that the
LSTM model trained on fragments is necessary for finding
bugs in the JS engines.
Resolving reference errors. We evaluated the importance of
the reference error resolution step (recall §5.3.2) in finding
JS engine bugs. Specifically, we ran Montage with the same
settings as other approaches while letting it skip the reference
error resolution step but still leverage the same LSTM model.
The last column of Table 1 demonstrates that Montage finds
fewer bugs if the resolving step is not applied, denoting that
the error resolving step improves the bug-finding capability of
Montage. However, Montage still found more bugs than the
other state-of-the-art fuzzers and the random approach even
without the resolving step. Considering the random approach
also takes advantages of the error resolution step, the LSTM
model significantly contributes to finding JS engine bugs.
Pass rate. One of the key objectives of Montage is to generate
a valid JS test so that it can trigger deep bugs in JS engines.
Thus, we further measured how the use of language models
affects the pass rate of generated codes. A pass rate indicates
whether generated test cases are indeed executed after passing
both syntax and semantic checking.
Figure 12 illustrates the pass rate of 100,000 JS tests gen-
erated by the four different approaches: Montage with and
without resolving reference errors, the random selection, and
the Markov model. We excluded the character/token-level
RNN approach because only 0.58% of the generated tests
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Markov
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Figure 12: The pass rate measured against four different ap-
proaches: Montage (ktop = 64) with and without resolving
reference errors, random selection, and Markov model. Mon-
tage without resolving reference errors is denoted by †.
were executed without errors. Such a low pass rate could be
one possible reason why this approach failed to find many
bugs, as shown in Table 1. As Liu et al. [32] also stated in
their paper, we believe this result is attributed to the lack of
training instances and the unique characteristics inherent in
the regression test suite.
Note from the figure that resolving reference errors in-
creases the pass rate by 12.2%. As a result, this helped Mon-
tage to find more bugs, as shown in Table 1. On the other
hand, the pass rates of the random selection and Markov
model-guided approach were 5.2% and 11% greater than that
of Montage, respectively. We manually inspected the JS tests
generated by the random selection and the Markov model-
guided approaches. We concluded that these differences stem
from appending a small number of fragments. For instance,
if a model always replaces one fragment, such as a string lit-
eral, from the seed file, all generated JS tests will be executed
without errors.
7.6 Field Tests
We evaluated the capability of Montage in finding real-world
bugs. We have run Montage for 1.5 months on the latest
production versions of the four major engines: ChakraCore,
JavaScriptCore, SpiderMonkey, and V8. For this evaluation,
we collected datasets from the repository of each JS engine
at the version of February 3, 2019. We additionally collected
165 PoCs that triggered known CVEs as our dataset. Then,
we trained the LSTM model for each JS engine.
Montage has found 37 unique bugs from the four major JS
engines so far. Among the found bugs, 34 bugs were from
ChakraCore. The remaining two and one bugs were from
JavaScriptCore and V8, respectively. We manually triaged
each bug and reported all the found bugs to the vendors. In
total, 26 of the reported bugs have been patched so far.
Especially, we reported three of the found bugs as security-
related because they caused memory corruptions of the tar-
get JS engines. The three security bugs were discovered in
ChakraCore 1.11.7, ChakraCore 1.12.0 (beta), and JavaScript-
Core 2.23.3, respectively. Note that all of them got CVE IDs:
CVE-2019-0860, CVE-2019-0923, and CVE-2019-8594. Par-
ticularly, we were rewarded for the bugs found in ChakraCore
with a bounty of 5,000 USD.
Our results demonstrate that Montage is capable of finding
37 real-world JS engine bugs, including three security bugs.
We further describe one of the real-world security bugs that
Montage found in §7.7.3.
7.7 Case Study
To show how Montage leverages the existing structure of the
regression test, we introduce three bugs that Montage found.
We show two bugs that Montage found in ChakraCore 1.4.1
from the experiment in §7.4. We then describe one of the real-
world security bugs found in the latest version of ChakraCore,
which is already patched. Note that we minimized all test
cases for ease of explanation.
7.7.1 CVE-2017-8729
1 (function () {
2 for (var v0 in [{
3 v1 = class {},
4 v2 = 2010
5 }.v2 = 20]) {
6 for([] in {
7 value: function () {},
8 writable: false
9 }){}
10 }
11 })();
Figure 13: A test code that triggers CVE-2017-8729 on
ChakraCore 1.4.1.
Figure 13 shows the minimized version of a gener-
ated test that triggers CVE-2017-8729 on ChakraCore
1.4.1. From its seed file, Montage removed the body of
FunctionExpression and composed a new subtree corre-
sponding to Lines 2-10. Particularly, Montage appended 54
fragments to generate the new test.
ChakraCore is supposed to reject the generated test be-
fore its execution because it has a syntax error in the
ObjectPattern corresponding to Lines 2-5. However, as-
suming the ObjectPattern to be an ObjectExpression,
ChakraCore successfully parses the test and incorrectly infers
the type of the property v2 to be a setter. Thus, the engine
crashes with a segmentation fault when it calls the setter in
Line 5. Interestingly, the latest version of ChakraCore still
executes this syntax-broken JS test without errors but does
not crash.
The original regression test checked the functionalities re-
garding a complicated ObjectPattern. Similarly, the gener-
ated test triggered a type confusion vulnerability while parsing
the new ObjectPattern. Therefore, we believe that this case
captures the design goal of Montage, which leverages an exist-
ing regression test and puts it in a different execution context
to find a potential bug.
7.7.2 CVE-2017-8656
1 var v1 = {
2 'a': function () {}
3 }
4 var v2 = 'a';
5 (function () {
6 try {
7 } catch ([v0 = (v1[v2]. __proto__(1, 'b'))]) {
8 var v0 = 4;
9 }
10 v0++;
11 })();
Figure 14: A test code that triggers CVE-2017-8656 on
ChakraCore 1.4.1.
Figure 14 shows a test case generated by Montage
that triggers CVE-2017-8656 on ChakraCore 1.4.1. Its
seed file had a different AssignmentExpression as the
parameter of a CatchClause in Line 7. From the seed
AST, Montage removed a subtree corresponding to the
AssignmentExpression in Line 7 and mutated it by append-
ing eight fragments that the LSTM model suggested.
In the generated code, the variable v0 is first declared as
the parameter of the CatchClause (Line 7) and then rede-
clared in its body (Line 8). At this point, the ChakraCore
bytecode generator becomes confused with the scope of these
two variables and incorrectly selects which one to initialize.
Consequently, the variable v0 in Line 8 remains uninitialized.
As the JS engine accesses the uninitialized symbol in Line 10,
it crashes with a segmentation fault.
We note that the seed JS test aimed to check possible scope
confusions, and the generated code also elicits a new vulnera-
bility while testing a functionality similar to the one its seed
JS test checks. Hence, this test case fits the design objective
of Montage.
7.7.3 CVE-2019-0860
Figure 15 describes a JS test triggering CVE-2019-0860 on
ChakraCore 1.12.0 (beta), which we reported to the vendor.
Its seed file had a CallExpression instead of the statements
in Lines 3-4. From the seed JS test, Montage removed a
subtree corresponding to the BlockStatement of the func-
tion f0 and appended 19 fragments to compose a new block
of statements (Lines 2-4). Notably, Montage revived the
AssignmentExpression statement in Line 2, which is a re-
quired precondition to execute the two subsequent statements
and trigger the security bug.
The seed regression test was designed to test whether JS
engines correctly handle referencing the arguments property
1 function f0(f, p = {}) {
2 f.__proto__ = p;
3 f.arguments = 44;
4 f.arguments === 44;
5 }
6
7 let v1 = new Proxy({}, {});
8 for (let v0 = 0; v0 < 1000; ++v0) {
9 f0(function () {'use strict ';}, v1);
10 f0(class C {}, v1);
11 }
Figure 15: A test code that triggers CVE-2019-0860 on
ChakraCore 1.12.0 (beta).
of a function in the strict mode. For usual cases, JS engines do
not allow such referencing; however, to place the execution
context in an exceptional case, the seed JS test enables the
access by adding a Proxy object to the prototype chain of the
function f (Line 2). As a result, this new test is able to access
and modify the property value without raising a type error
(Line 3).
While performing the JIT optimization process initiated
by the for loop in Lines 8-11, ChakraCore misses a postpro-
cessing step of the property in Line 3, thus enabling to write
an arbitrary value on the memory. Consequently, the engine
crashes with a segmentation fault as this property is accessed
in Line 4.
Note that the generated test case triggers a new vulnera-
bility while vetting the same functionality that its seed tests.
Moreover, the GlobOpt.cpp file, which is the most frequently
patched file to fix CVEs assigned to ChakraCore, was patched
to fix this vulnerability. Therefore, this JS test demonstrates
that Montage successfully discovers bugs that it aims to find.
8 Related Work
Fuzzing. There have been a vast volume of research on
generation-based fuzzing. Highly-structured file fuzzing [15,
42], protocol fuzzing [46, 47], kernel fuzzing [19, 28, 55], and
interpreter fuzzing [2, 6, 12, 38, 41, 56] are representative re-
search examples.
IMF infers the model of sequential kernel API calls to fuzz
macOS kernels [19]. Dewey et al. [12] generated code with
specified combinations of syntactic features and semantic
behaviors by constraint logic programming.
Godefroid et al. [16] trained a language model from a large
number of PDF files and let the model learn the relations
between objects constituting the PDF files. Their approach
of using a language model in generating tests is similar to
ours per se, but their approach is not directly applicable to
generating JS tests, which demands modeling complicated
control and data dependencies.
Cummins et al. [11] also proposed a similar approach. They
trained an LSTM language model from a large corpus of
OpenCL code. Unlike Montage, they trained the model at a
character/token-level, which does not consider the composi-
tional relations among the AST subtrees.
TreeFuzz [41] is another model-based fuzzer. Its model
is built on the frequencies of co-occurring nodes and edges
from given AST examples. Their modeling of generating
tests is not directly applicable to the prevalent state-of-the-art
language models, tailored to train word sequences, not node
and edge relations in ASTs.
Aschermann et al. [2] and Blazytko et al. [6] recently pro-
posed NAUTILUS and GRIMOIRE, respectively. Both fuzzers
test programs that take highly structured inputs by leveraging
code coverage. Based on a given grammar, NAUTILUS gener-
ates a new JS test and checks whether it hits new code cov-
erage for further mutation chances. Contrary to NAUTILUS,
GRIMOIRE requires no user-provided components, such as
grammar specification and language models, but synthesizes
inputs that trigger new code coverage. As they stated, GRI-
MOIRE has difficulties in generating inputs with complex
structures, requiring semantic information.
Previous studies of mutational fuzzing [7, 18, 24, 32, 44, 54,
57,58] focus on altering given seeds to leverage functionalities
that the seeds already test.
LangFuzz [24] is a mutational fuzzing tool that substitutes
a non-terminal node in a given AST with code fragments. It
iteratively replaces non-terminal nodes in the step of inserting
fragments. However, LangFuzz does not consider any context
regarding picking a promising candidate to cause a target
JS engine crash. On the other hand, Montage is capable of
learning implicit relations between fragments that may be
inherent in given examples.
Liu et al. [32] proposed a mutation-based approach to fuzz
the target program. Given a large corpus of C code, they
trained a sequence-to-sequence model to capture the inherent
pattern of input at character-level. Then, they leveraged the
trained model to mutate the seed. Their approach suffers from
the limitation that the model generates many malformed tests,
such as unbalanced parenthesis.
Language model for code. Hindle et al. [22] measured the
naturalness of software by computing the cross-entropy val-
ues over lexical code tokens in large JAVA and C applications.
They also first demonstrated even count-based n-gram lan-
guage models are applicable to code completion. To make
more accurate suggestions for code completion, SLAMC [40]
incorporated semantic information, including type, scope, and
role for each lexical token. SLANG [43] lets a model learn
API call sequences from Android applications. It then uses
such a model to improve the precision of code completion.
GraLan learns the relations between API calls from the graph
of API call sequences, and ASTLan uses GraLan to fill holes
in the AST to complete the code [39].
Maddison et al. [33] studied the generative models of nat-
ural source code based on PCFGs and source code-specific
structures. Bielik et al. [5] suggested a new generative prob-
abilistic model of code called a probabilistic higher order
grammar, which generalizes PCFGs and parameterizes the
production rules on a context.
The objective of using a language model in all of the above
works is to make better suggestions for code completion. How-
ever, Montage focuses on generating JS tests that should be
accepted by a target JS engine.
9 Conclusion
We present Montage, the first fuzzing tool that leverages an
NNLM in generating JS tests. We propose a novel algorithm
of modeling the hierarchical structures of a JS test case and
the relationships among such structures into a sequence of
fragments. The encoding of an AST into a fragment sequence
enables Montage to learn the relationships among the frag-
ments by using an LSTM model. Montage found 37 real-
world bugs in the latest JS engines, which demonstrates its
effectiveness in finding JS engine bugs.
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